Art and Interpretation

picture of man looking at art objectsInterpretation in fine art refers to the attribution of meaning to a piece of work. A point on which people often disagree is whether the creative person'southward or author's intention is relevant to the interpretation of the piece of work. In the Anglo-American analytic philosophy of art, views nearly interpretation branch into ii major camps: intentionalism and anti-intentionalism, with an initial focus on one art, namely literature.

The anti-intentionalist maintains that a work's meaning is entirely determined by linguistic and literary conventions, thereby rejecting the relevance of the author's intention. The underlying assumption of this position is that a work enjoys autonomy with respect to meaning and other aesthetically relevant properties. Actress-textual factors, such equally the author'southward intention, are neither necessary nor sufficient for significant conclusion. This early position in the analytic tradition is frequently called conventionalism because of its strong emphasis on convention. Anti-intentionalism gradually went out of favor at the end of the 20th century, but it has seen a revival in the and then-chosen value-maximizing theory, which recommends that the interpreter seek value-maximizing interpretations constrained by convention and, co-ordinate to a different version of the theory, by the relevant contextual factors at the time of the work'due south production.

By contrast, the initial make of intentionalism—actual intentionalism—holds that interpreters should concern themselves with the writer's intention, for a work's meaning is affected by such intention. At that place are at least 3 versions of bodily intentionalism. The absolute version identifies a work's pregnant fully with the author's intention, therefore allowing that an author can intend her work to mean whatever she wants it to mean. The extreme version acknowledges that the possible meanings a piece of work tin sustain accept to be constrained by convention. According to this version, the author'south intention picks the correct meaning of the piece of work as long every bit it fits one of the possible meanings; otherwise, the work ends up being meaningless. The moderate version claims that when the writer's intention does not match any of the possible meanings, meaning is fixed instead by convention and peradventure also context.

A second brand of intentionalism, which finds a middle course between actual intentionalism and anti-intentionalism, is hypothetical intentionalism. According to this position, a piece of work's meaning is the appropriate audience's all-time hypothesis well-nigh the author's intention based on publicly available information almost the author and her piece of work at the time of the piece's product. A variation on this position attributes the intention to a hypothetical writer who is postulated by the interpreter and who is constituted by work features. Such authors are sometimes said to be fictional because they, being purely conceptual, differ decisively from flesh-and-blood authors.

This article elaborates on these theories of estimation and considers their notable objections. The fence about interpretation covers other art forms in add-on to literature. The theories of interpretation are also extended across many of the arts. This broad outlook is causeless throughout the article, although nothing said is afflicted even if a narrow focus on literature is adopted.

Table of Contents

  1. Key Concepts: Intention, Pregnant, and Interpretation
  2. Anti-Intentionalism
    1. The Intentional Fallacy
    2. Beardsley'south Speech Human activity Theory of Literature
    3. Notable Objections and Replies
  3. Value-Maximizing Theory
    1. Overview
    2. Notable Objections and Replies
  4. Bodily Intentionalism
    1. Absolute Version
    2. Extreme Version
    3. Moderate Version
    4. Objections to Actual Intentionalism
  5. Hypothetical Intentionalism
    1. Overview
    2. Notable Objections and Replies
  6. Hypothetical Intentionalism and the Hypothetical Creative person
    1. Overview
    2. Notable Objections and Replies
  7. Conclusion
  8. References and Further Reading

1. Key Concepts: Intention, Meaning, and Interpretation

It is common for us to ask questions about works of art due to puzzlement or curiosity. Sometimes nosotros practice non sympathize the indicate of the work. What is the signal of, for instance, Metamorphosis by Kafka or Duchamp's Fountain? Sometimes at that place is ambiguity in a piece of work and we desire it resolved. For example, is the final sequence of Christopher Nolan's film Inception reality or another dream? Or exercise ghosts really exist in Henry James's The Turn of the Screw? Sometimes we make hypotheses nearly details in a work. For case, does the adult female in white in Raphael's The Schoolhouse of Athens represent Hypatia? Is the conch in William Golding's Lord of the Flies a symbol for civilization and democracy?

What these questions have in common is that all of them seek after things that go beyond what the piece of work literally presents or says. They are all concerned with the implicit contents of the piece of work or, for simplicity, with the meanings of a work. A stardom can be drawn between 2 kinds of meaning in terms of telescopic. Meaning can exist global in the sense that information technology concerns the work's theme, thesis, or point. For example, an audience start encountering Duchamp'south Fountain would want to know Duchamp's point in producing this readymade or, put otherwise, what the work as a whole is made to convey. The aforementioned goes for Kafka'southward Metamorphosis, which contains so bizarre a plot as to brand the reader wonder what the story is all about. Meaning can also exist local insofar as it is about what a part of a work conveys. Inquiries into the meaning of a particular sequence in Christopher Nolan'due south picture, the adult female in Raphael's fresco, or the conch in William Golding'due south Lord of the Flies are directed at only part of the work.

We are said to exist interpreting when trying to find out answers to questions about the pregnant of a work. In other words, interpretation is the endeavor to attribute work-meaning. Here "attribute" can hateful "recover," which is retrieving something already existing in a work; or it can more weakly mean "impose," which entails ascribing a meaning to a work without ontologically creating anything. Many of the major positions in the fence endorse either the impositional view or the retrieval view.

When an interpretative question arises, a frequent way to deal with information technology is to resort to the creator'southward intention. Nosotros may inquire the artist to reveal her intention if such an opportunity is bachelor; nosotros may too check what she says about her work in an interview or autobiography. If we have access to her personal documents such as diaries or messages, they too volition become our interpretative resources. These are all evidence of the artist'southward intention. When the show is compelling, we have good reason to believe it reveals the creative person'southward intention.

Certainly, there are cases in which external bear witness of the artist's intention is absent, including when the work is anonymous. This poses no difficulty for philosophers who view appeal to artistic intention as crucial, for they accept that internal evidence—the work itself—is the all-time bear witness of the artist's intention. Most of the time, shut attention to details of the work will lead u.s.a. to what the artist intended the work to mean.

But what is intention exactly? Intention is a kind of mental state usually characterized equally a design or plan in the creative person's mind to be realized in her artistic cosmos. This rough view of intention is sometimes refined into the reductive analysis ane will find in a contemporaneous textbook of philosophy of mind: intention is constituted by belief and desire. Some actual intentionalists explain the nature of intention from a Wittgensteinian perspective: authorial intention is viewed as the purposive structure of the work that tin can be discerned by close inspection. This view challenges the assumption that intentions are ever private and logically contained of the work they cause, which is often interpreted equally a position held by anti-intentionalists.

A 2005 proposal holds that intentions are executive attitudes toward plans (Livingston). These attitudes are house but defeasible commitments to acting on them. Contra the reductive analysis of intention, this view holds that intentions are distinct and real mental states that serve a range of functions irreducible to other mental states.

Clarifying each of these basic terms (meaning, interpretation, and intention) requires an essay-length treatment that cannot be done here. For electric current purposes, it suffices to introduce the aforesaid views and proposals commonly assumed. Bear in listen that for the most part the debate over art interpretation proceeds without consensus on how to define these terms, and clarifications announced but when necessary.

two. Anti-Intentionalism

Anti-intentionalism is considered the kickoff theory of interpretation to emerge in the analytic tradition. It is commonly seen as affiliated with the New Criticism move that was prevalent in the middle of the twentieth century. The position was initially a reaction against biographical criticism, the master idea of which is that the interpreter, to grasp the meaning of a work, needs to study the life of the writer because the piece of work is seen as reflecting the author'south mental earth. This approach led to people considering the writer's biographical data rather than her work. Literary criticism became criticism of biography, non criticism of literary works. Against this trend, literary critic William Thousand. Wimsatt and philosopher Monroe C. Beardsley coauthored a seminal paper "The Intentional Fallacy" in 1946, marking the starting point of the intention fence. Beardsley later on extended his anti-intentionalist stance beyond the arts in his monumental volume Aesthetics: Problems in the Philosophy of Criticism ([1958] 1981a).

a. The Intentional Fallacy

The main idea of the intentional fallacy is that appeal to the creative person'southward intention outside the work is fallacious, because the piece of work itself is the verdict of what pregnant it bears. This contention is based on the anti-intentionalist'due south ontological assumption about works of art.

This underlying supposition is that a work of art enjoys autonomy with respect to meaning and other aesthetically relevant properties. As Beardsley'south Principle of Autonomy shows, critical statements will in the end need to be tested confronting the work itself, non against factors outside it. To give Beardsley's instance, whether a statue symbolizes human destiny depends not on what its maker says but on our existence able to make out that theme from the statue on the basis of our cognition of artistic conventions: if the statue shows a man confined to a cage, we may well conclude that the statue indeed symbolizes human destiny, for by convention the prototype of solitude fits that alleged theme. The anti-intentionalist principle hence follows: the interpreter should focus on what she can observe in the work itself—the internal evidence—rather than on external evidence, such equally the creative person's biography, to reveal her intentions.

Anti-intentionalism is sometimes chosen conventionalism because information technology sees convention as necessary and sufficient in determining piece of work-meaning. On this view, the creative person'south intention at best underdetermines pregnant even when operating successfully. This can be seen from the famous statement offered by Wimsatt and Beardsley: either the artist's intention is successfully realized in the work, or it fails; if the intention is successfully realized in the work, appeal to external show of the artist'south intention is not necessary (we can discover the intention from the work); if it fails, such appeal becomes insufficient (the intention turns out to be extraneous to the work). The conclusion is that an appeal to external prove of the artist's intention is either unnecessary or insufficient. Every bit the 2d premise of the argument shows, the artist's intention is insufficient in determining pregnant for the reason that convention solitary tin can do the trick. As a consequence, the overall argument entails the irrelevance of external evidence of the artist's intention. To remember of such evidence as relevant commits the intentional fallacy.

There is a second manner to codify the intentional fallacy. Since the artist does non ever successfully realize her intention, the inference is invalid from the premise that the artist intended her work to mean p to the conclusion that the work in question does mean p. Therefore, the term "intentional fallacy" has 2 layers of meaning: normatively, information technology refers to the questionable principle of interpretation that external testify of intent should be appealed to; ontologically, it refers to the fallacious inference from probable intention to work-significant.

b. Beardsley'due south Speech communication Act Theory of Literature

Beardsley at a later point develops an ontology of literature in favor of anti-intentionalism (1981b, 1982). Reviving Plato's faux theory of art, Beardsley claims that fictional works are essentially imitations of illocutionary acts. Briefly put, illocutionary acts are performed by utterances in particular contexts. For example, when a detective, convinced that someone is the killer, points his finger at that person and utters the sentence "you did it," the detective is performing the illocutionary human action of accusing someone. What illocutionary act is existence performed is traditionally construed as jointly determined by the speaker'south intention to perform that deed, the words uttered, and the relevant conditions in that particular context. Other examples of illocutionary acts include asserting, warning, castigating, asking, and the like.

Literary works can exist seen equally utterances; that is, texts used in a particular context to perform different illocutionary acts by authors. However, Beardsley claims that in the example of fictional works in item, the purported illocutionary force will always exist removed so as to make the utterance an imitation of that illocutionary act. When an attempted act is insufficiently performed, it ends up existence represented or imitated. For instance, if I say "please pass me the salt" in my dining room when no one except me is there, I end upwards representing (imitating) the illocutionary human activity of requesting because there is no uptake from the intended audience. Since the illocutionary deed in this example is merely imitated, it qualifies as a fictional human activity. This is why Beardsley sees fiction every bit representation.

Consider the uptake status in the instance of fictional works. Such works are not addressed to the audience as a talk is: there is no concrete context in which the audience tin be readily identified. The uttered text hence loses its illocutionary force and ends upward beingness a representation. Bated from this "accost without access," some other obtaining status for a fictional illocutionary act is the being of non-referring names and descriptions in a fictional piece of work. If an author writes a verse form in which she greets the great detective Sherlock Holmes, this greeting volition never obtain, considering the name Sherlock Holmes does not refer to any existing person in the world. The greeting will just end up being a representation or a fictional illocution. By parity of reasoning, fictional works end upwards being representations of illocutionary acts in that they always contain names or descriptions involving events that never take place.

Now we must inquire: by what benchmark do we decide what illocutionary act is represented? It cannot be the speaker or author's intention, because even if a speaker intends to stand for a item illocutionary act, she might end up representing another. Since the possibility of failed intention always exists, intention would non be an advisable benchmark. Convention is again invoked to make up one's mind the correct illocutionary human activity being represented. It is true that any practice of representing is intentional at the start in the sense that what is represented is determined past the representer's intention. Nevertheless, once the connection between a symbol and what it is used to represent is established, intention is said to exist detached from that connection, and deciding the content of a representation becomes a sheer matter of convention.

Since a fictional work is essentially a representation of an insufficiently performed illocutionary human action, determining what it represents does not require us to go beyond that incomplete operation, just equally determining what a mime is imitating does not require the audition to consider anything outside her performance, such equally her intention. What the mime is imitating is completely determined by how nosotros conventionally construe the act being performed. In a similar way, when considering what illocutionary act is represented by a fictional work, the interpreter should rely on internal prove rather than on external evidence of authorial intent to construct the illocutionary human action being represented. If, based on internal data, a story reads similar a castigation of war, it is suitably seen as a representation of that illocutionary act. The conclusion is that the author's intention plays no office in fixing the content of a fictional work.

Lastly, it is worth mentioning that Beardsley's attitude toward nonfictional works is ambivalent. Obviously, his spoken language human activity argument applies to fictional works only, and he accepts that nonfictional works tin be 18-carat illocutions. This category of works tends to take a more identifiable audience, who is hence non addressed without access. With illocutions, Beardsley continues to argue for an anti-intentionalist view of pregnant according to which the utterer's intention does not determine meaning. But his accepting nonfictional works as illocutions opens the door to considerations of external or contextual factors that go against his before stance, which is globally anti-intentionalist.

c. Notable Objections and Replies

One firsthand business with anti-intentionalism is whether convention alone tin can point to a single meaning (Hirsch, 1967). The mutual reason why people argue about estimation is precisely that the piece of work itself does not offer sufficient evidence to disambiguate pregnant. Very oftentimes a work can sustain multiple meanings and the problem of choice prompts some people to appeal to the artist's intention. It does not seem plausible to say that one can assign only a single meaning to works like Ulysses or Picasso'southward abstruse paintings if 1 concentrates solely on internal evidence. To this objection, Beardsley (1970) insists that, in most cases, appeal to the coherence of the piece of work can eventually exit united states of america with a single correct estimation.

A 2d serious objection to anti-intentionalism is the case of irony (Hirsch, 1976, pp. 24–5). It seems reasonable to say that whether a work is ironic depends on if its creator intended information technology to exist then. For instance, based on internal evidence, many people took Daniel Defoe's pamphlet The Shortest Mode with the Dissenters to exist genuinely against the Dissenters upon its publication. Still, the but ground for saying that the pamphlet is ironic seems to be Defoe'due south intention. If irony is a crucial component of the work, ignoring it would fail to respect the work's identity. It follows that irony cannot be grounded in internal evidence solitary. Beardsley'south respond (1982, pp. 203–7) is that irony must offer the possibility of agreement. If the artist cannot imagine anyone taking it ironically, in that location would be no reason to believe the work to be ironic.

However, the problem of irony is only role of a bigger concern that challenges the irrelevance of external factors to interpretation. Many factors present at the time of the work'due south creation seem to play a key role in shaping a work's identity and content. Missing out on these factors would lead us to misidentifying the work (and hence to misinterpreting it).

For instance, a work will not be seen every bit revolutionary unless the interpreter knows something well-nigh the contemporaneous artistic tradition: ignoring the work's innovation amounts to accepting that the work can lose its revolutionary grapheme while remaining self-identical. If we meet this character every bit identity-relevant, we should then have it into consideration in our interpretation. The same line of thinking goes for other identity-conferring contextual factors, such as the social-historical weather and the relations the work bears to contemporaneous or prior works. The present view is thus called ontological contextualism to foreground the ontological claim that the identity and content of a piece of work of art are in office determined past the relations it bears to its context of production.

Contextualism leads to an of import distinction between piece of work and text in the example of literature. In a nutshell: a text is non context-dependent just a work is. The anti-intentionalist stance thus leads the interpreter to consider texts rather than works considering it rejects considerations of external or contextual factors. The aforementioned stardom goes for other art forms when nosotros depict a comparison betwixt an creative product considered in its brute form and in its context of creation. For convenience, the discussion "work" is used throughout with notes on whether contextualism is taken or not.

As a reply to the contextualist objection, it has been argued (Davies, 2005) that Beardsley's position allows for contextualism. If this is convincing, the contextualist criticism of anti-intentionalism would non be conclusive.

3. Value-Maximizing Theory

a. Overview

The value-maximizing theory can be viewed as being derived from anti-intentionalism. Its core claim is that the primary aim of art interpretation is to offer interpretations that maximize the value of a piece of work. In that location are at least two versions of the maximizing position distinguished by the commitment to contextualism. When the maximizing position is committed to contextualism, the constraint on interpretation will exist convention plus context (Davies, 2007); otherwise, the constraint volition be convention only, equally endorsed past anti-intentionalism (Goldman, 2013).

As indicated, the discussion "maximize" does not imply monism. That is, the present position does not claim that in that location can exist merely a single way to maximize the value of a piece of work of fine art. On the contrary, it seems reasonable to presume that in most cases the interpreter can envisage several readings to bring out the value of the work. For example, Kafka's Metamorphosis has generated a number of rewarding interpretations, and it is hard to argue for a single all-time among them. Equally long as an interpretation is revealing or insightful under the relevant interpretative constraints, we may count it as value-maximizing. Such being the case, the value-maximizing theory may be relabelled the "value-enhancing" or "value-satisfying" theory.

Given this pluralist picture, the maximizer, unlike the anti-intentionalist, will need to accept the indeterminacy thesis that convention (and context, if she endorses contextualism) lonely does not guarantee the unambiguity of the work. This allows the maximizing position to bypass the challenge posed by said thesis, rendering it a more than flexible position than anti-intentionalism in regard to the number of legitimate interpretations.

Encapsulating the maximizing position in a few words: it holds that the primary aim of art estimation is to enhance appreciative satisfaction past identifying interpretations that bring out the value of a work within reasonable limits prepare by convention (and context).

b. Notable Objections and Replies

The actual intentionalist will maintain that figurative features such as irony and innuendo must be analysed intentionalistically. The maximizer with contextualist delivery can counter this objection by dealing with intentions more sophisticatedly. If the relevant features are identity conferring, they will be respected and accepted in interpretation. In this example, whatever interpretation that ignores the intended feature ends up misidentifying the piece of work. But if the relevant features are not identity conferring, more than room will be left for the interpreter to consider them. The intended feature can be ignored if information technology does not add to the value of the work. By contrast, where such a feature is not intended but can exist put in the work, the interpreter can still build it into the interpretation if it is value enhancing.

The most important objection to the maximizing view has it that the nowadays position is in danger of turning a mediocre work into a masterpiece. Ed Wood's film Plan 9 from Outer Space is the most discussed case. Many people consider this work to exist the worst film e'er fabricated. However, interpreted from a postmodern perspective as satire—which is presumably a value-enhancing interpretation—would turn it into a archetype.

The maximizer with contextualist leanings can reply that the postmodern reading fails to identify the film as authored past Wood (Davies, 2007, p, 187). Postmodern views were not available in Wood's time, and so information technology was impossible for the film to be created every bit such. Identifying the film as postmodernist amounts to anachronism that disrespects the work's identity. The moral of this case is that the maximizer does not blindly enhance the value of a piece of work. Rather, the work to be interpreted needs to exist contextualized outset to ensure that subsequent attributions of artful value are done in light of the true and fair presentation of the work.

4. Actual Intentionalism

Contra anti-intentionalism, actual intentionalism maintains that the artist'southward intention is relevant to interpretation. The position comes in at least three forms, giving different weights to intention. The absolute version claims that work-meaning is fully determined by the artist's intention; the farthermost version claims that the work ends up being meaningless when the artist'south intention is incompatible with it; and the moderate version claims that either the artist'southward intention determines meaning or—if this fails—pregnant is determined instead past convention (and context, if contextualism is endorsed).

a. Absolute Version

Accented actual intentionalism claims that a work ways whatever its creator intends it to mean. Put otherwise, it sees the creative person'south intention as the necessary and sufficient condition for a work's pregnant. This position is often dubbed Humpty-Dumptyism with reference to the character Humpty-Dumpty in Through the Looking-Drinking glass. This character tries to convince Alice that he can make a give-and-take mean what he chooses it to hateful. This unsettling conclusion is supported by the statement about intentionless significant: a mark (or a sequence of marks) cannot have meaning unless information technology is produced past an amanuensis capable of intentional activities; therefore, significant is identical to intention.

It seems plausible to abandon the thought that marks on the sand are a poem once we know they were caused by blow. But this at all-time proves that intention is the necessary condition for something's being meaningful; it does not prove farther that what something means is what the agent intended it to hateful. In other words, the statement about intentionless meaning does a meliorate job in showing that intention is an indispensable ingredient for meaningfulness than in showing that intention infallibly determines the significant conveyed.

b. Extreme Version

To avoid Humpty-Dumptyism, the extreme bodily intentionalist rejects the view that the artist'south intention infallibly determines work-meaning and accepts the indeterminacy thesis that convention alone does non guarantee a single evident meaning to be plant in a work. The farthermost intentionalist claims further that the pregnant of the piece of work is fixed by the creative person'due south intention if her intention identifies one of the possible meanings sustained past the piece of work; otherwise, the work ends up beingness meaningless (Hirsch, 1967). Better put, the extreme intentionalist sees intention as the necessary rather than sufficient condition for work-significant.

Aside from the unsatisfactory result that a work becomes meaningless when the artist's intention fails, the nowadays position faces a dilemma when dealing with the case of figurative linguistic communication (Nathan, in Iseminger (1992)). Take irony for example. The first horn of the dilemma is equally follows: Constrained by linguistic conventions, the range of possible meanings has to include the negation of the literal meaning in order for the intended irony to be constructive. Simply this results in absolute intentionalism: every expression would be ironic equally long as the writer intends it to be. Only—this is the second horn—if the range of possible meanings does not include the negation of literal meaning, the expression simply becomes meaningless in that at that place is no appropriate pregnant possible for the author to actualize. Information technology seems that a broader notion of convention is needed to explain figurative language. Merely if the extreme intentionalist makes that move, her intentionalist position will be undermined, for the writer'due south intention would be given a less important role than convention in such cases. Nonetheless, this problem does not arise when the actual intentionalist is committed to contextualism, for in that example the contextual factors that brand the intended irony possible will exist taken into account.

c. Moderate Version

Though in that location are several different versions of moderate actual intentionalism, they share the common basis that when the artist's intention fails, significant is fixed instead past convention and context. (Whether all moderate actual intentionalists take context into account is controversial and this article volition not dig into this controversy for reasons of space.) That is, when the artist's intention is successful, it determines meaning; otherwise, meaning is determined past convention plus context (Carroll, 2001; Stecker, 2003; Livingston, 2005).

As seen, an intention is successful so long equally information technology identifies one of the possible meanings sustained past the piece of work fifty-fifty if the meaning identified is less plausible than other candidates. Just what exactly is the interpreter doing when she identifies that significant? It is reasonable to say that the interpreter does not demand to ascertain all the possible meanings and see if in that location is a fit. Rather, all she needs to practise is to run across whether the intended pregnant can be read in accordance with the piece of work. This is why the moderate intentionalist puts the success condition in terms of compatibility: an intention is successful and so long equally the intended significant is compatible with the piece of work. The fact that a certain meaning is uniform with the work means that the work can sustain information technology equally ane of its possible meanings.

Unfortunately, the notion of compatibility seems to allow foreign cases in which an insignificant intention can determine work-significant as long as information technology is non explicitly rejected by the relevant interpretative constraint. For case, if Agatha Christie reveals that Hercule Poirot is actually a smart Martian in disguise, the moderate intentionalist would need to accept information technology considering this proclamation of intention tin can still be said to exist compatible with the text in the sense that information technology is not rejected past textual show. To avoid this bad result, compatibility needs to exist qualified.

The moderate intentionalist and so analyses compatibility in terms of the meshing condition, which refers to a sufficient degree of coherence between the content of the intention and the work's rhetorical patterns. An intention is compatible with the work in the sense that it meshes well with the work. The Martian case will hence be ruled out by the meshing condition because information technology does not engage sufficiently with the narrative even if it is not explicitly rejected by textual evidence. The meshing condition is a minimal or weak success status in that it does not require the intention to mesh with every textual characteristic. A sufficient amount will exercise, though the moderate intentionalist admits that the line is not e'er easy to describe. With this weak standard for success, it can happen that the interpreter is non able to discern the intended meaning in the work earlier she learns of the artist'due south intention.

There is a second kind of success condition which adopts a stronger standard (Stecker, 2003; Davies, 2007, pp. 170–1). This standard for success states that an intention is successful only in case the intended meaning, amidst the possible meanings sustained by the piece of work, is the 1 nigh likely to secure uptake from a well-backgrounded audition (with contextual knowledge and all). For example, if a work of art, within the limits fix by convention and context, affords interpretations 10, y, and z, and x is more readily discerned than the other two past the advisable audition, then x is the meaning of the work.

These accounts of the success condition respond a notable objection to moderate intentionalism. This objection claims that moderate intentionalism faces an epistemic dilemma (Trivedi, 2001). Consider an epistemic question: how do we know whether an intention is successfully realized? Presumably, nosotros effigy out piece of work-meaning and the artist'due south intention respectively and independently of each other. And and then we compare the 2 to run across if there is a fit. Nevertheless, this move is redundant: if we can figure out work-meaning independently of actual intention, why do nosotros need the latter? And if work-meaning cannot be independently obtained, how tin we know information technology is a example where intentions are successfully realized and not a case where intentions failed? It follows that appeal to successful intention results in redundancy or indeterminacy.

The starting time horn of the dilemma assumes that work-pregnant can be obtained independently of noesis of successful intention, but this is simulated for moderate intentionalists, for they acknowledge that in many cases the piece of work presents ambiguity that cannot be resolved solely in virtue of internal evidence. The moderate intentionalist rejects the second horn by claiming that they do non make up one's mind the success of an intention by comparing independently obtained piece of work-pregnant with the artist'south intention (Stecker, 2010, pp. 154–v). Every bit already discussed, moderate intentionalists propose unlike success conditions that do not entreatment to the identity betwixt the artist's intention and work-meaning. Moderate intentionalists adopting the weak standard concord that success is defined past the degree of meshing; those who adopt the strong standard maintain that success is defined by the audience's ability to grasp the intention. Neither requires the interpreter to identify a work'southward significant independently of the artist's intention.

d. Objections to Actual Intentionalism

The most commonly raised objection is the epistemic worry, which asks: is intention knowable? It seems impossible for one to really know others' mental states, and the epistemic gap in this respect is thus unbridgeable. Actual intentionalists tend to dismiss this worry as insignificant and maintain that in many contexts (daily conversation or historical investigations) nosotros have no difficulty in discerning another person's intention (Carroll, 2009, pp. 71–v). In that case, why would things of a sudden stand differently when it comes to fine art interpretation? This is not to say that we succeed on every occasion of estimation, but that we exercise so in an amazingly big number of cases. That existence said, nosotros should not decline the appeal to intention solely because of the occasional failure.

Another objection is the publicity paradox (Nathan, 2006). The master idea is this: when someone South conveys something p past a production of an object O for public consumption, there is a second-order intention that the audience need not go beyond O to reach p; that is, there is no need to consult S'south offset-order intentions to understand O. Therefore, when an artist creates a work for public consumption, there is a second-society intention that her first-order intentions non exist consulted, otherwise it would indicate the failure of the artist. Actual intentionalism hence leads to the paradoxical claim that nosotros should and should not consult the artist's intentions.

The bodily intentionalist's response (Stecker, 2010, pp. 153–4) is this: non all artists take the second-order intention in question. If this premise is false, then the publicity argument becomes unsound. Even if it were true, the statement would still be invalid, because information technology confuses the intention that the artist intends to create something standing alone with the intention that her get-go-order intention need not be consulted. The paradox will not concur if this distinction is made.

Lastly, many criticisms are directed at a popular argument amidst actual intentionalists: the conversation statement (Carroll, 2001; Jannotta, 2014). An analogy between conversation and art interpretation is drawn, and bodily intentionalists merits that if we accept that art interpretation is a form of conversation, nosotros need to accept actual intentionalism as the right prescriptive account of interpretation, because the standard goal of an interlocutor in a conversation is to grasp what the speaker intends to say. (This is a premise even anti-intentionalists have, only they obviously turn down the further claim that art estimation is conversational. See Beardsley, 1970, ch.1.) This analogy has been severely criticized (Dickie, 2006; Nathan, 2006; Huddleston, 2012). The greatest disanalogy between conversation and fine art is that the latter is more than like a monologue delivered by the creative person rather than an interchange of ideas.

Ane way to meet the monologue objection is to specify more conspicuously the role of the conversational involvement. In fact, the actual intentionalist claims that the conversational interest should constrain other interests such as the artful interest. In other words, other interests can exist reconciled or piece of work with the conversational involvement. Have the instance of the hermeneutics of suspicion for example. Hermeneutics of suspicion is a skeptical attitude—often heavily politicized—adopted toward the explicit opinion of a work. Interpretations based on the hermeneutics of suspicion take to be constrained by the artist's non-ironic intention in order for them to count equally legitimate interpretations. For instance, in attributing racist tendencies to Jules Verne's Mysterious Island, in which the blackness slave Neb is portrayed as docile and superstitious, we demand to suppose that the tendencies are not ironic; otherwise, the suspicious reading becomes inappropriate. In this example, the artistic conversation does not stop upwardly beingness a monologue, for the suspicious hermeneut listens and understands Verne before responding with the suspicious reading, which is constrained by the conversational interest. A conversational interchange is hence completed.

5. Hypothetical Intentionalism

a. Overview

A compromise between actual intentionalism and anti-intentionalism is hypothetical intentionalism, the core claim of which is that the right pregnant of a work is adamant by the best hypothesis about the artist'southward intention made by a selected audition. The aim of estimation is and then to hypothesize what the artist intended when creating the piece of work from the perspective of the qualified audition (Tolhurst, 1979; Levinson, 1996).

Two points call for attention. Starting time, information technology is hypothesis—not truth—that matters. This ways that a hypothesis of the bodily intention will never be trumped by knowledge of that very intention. 2d, the membership of the audience is crucial because it determines the kind of evidence legitimate for the interpreter to utilise.

A 1979 proposal (Tolhurst) suggests that the relevant audience be singled out past the creative person's intention, that is, the audience intended to be addressed past the artist. Work-meaning is thus determined by the intended audience'southward best hypothesis about the artist'southward intention. This ways that the interpreter will need to equip herself with the relevant beliefs and background noesis of the intended audience in order to brand the best hypothesis. Put another way, hypothetical intentionalism focuses on the audition'due south uptake of an utterance addressed to them. This being so, what the audience relies on in comprehending the utterance will be based on what she knows about the utterer on that particular occasion. Following this contextualist line of thinking, the meaning of Jonathan Swift'south A Minor Proposal will non be the suggestion that the poor in Ireland might ease their economic pressure by selling their children as food to the rich; rather, given the background knowledge of Swift'south intended audience, the all-time hypothesis about the writer's intention is that he intended the work to be a satire that criticizes the heartless attitude toward the poor and Irish policy in general.

Nevertheless, in that location is a serious problem with the notion of an intended audition. If the intended audience is an extremely pocket-size group possessing esoteric cognition of the artist, meaning becomes a private matter, for the work can only exist properly understood in terms of private information shared betwixt artist and audience, and this results in something close to Humpty-Dumptyism, which is characteristic of absolute intentionalism.

To cope with this problem, the hypothetical intentionalist replaces the concept of an intended audience with that of an platonic or appropriate audience. Such an audition is not necessarily targeted by the creative person's intention and is ideal in the sense that its members are familiar with the public facts nearly the creative person and her work. In other words, the ideal audience seeks to anchor the work in its context of creation based on public evidence. This avoids the danger of interpreting the work on the basis of private prove.

The hypothetical intentionalist is enlightened that in some cases at that place will be competing interpretations which are equally good. An artful criterion is then introduced to adjudicate between these hypotheses. The artful consideration comes equally a tie billow: when we achieve 2 or more epistemically best hypotheses, the ane that makes the work artistically better should win.

Another notable stardom introduced past hypothetical intentionalism is that between semantic and categorial intention (Levinson, 1996, pp. 188–9). The kind of intention nosotros have been discussing is semantic: it is the intention past which an creative person conveys her message in the piece of work. By dissimilarity, categorial intention is the artist's intention to categorize her production, either every bit a piece of work of art, a certain artform (such equally Romantic literature), or a particular genre (such as lyric poesy). Categorial intention indirectly affects a work'due south semantic content because information technology determines how the interpreter conceptualizes the work at the key level. For instance, if a text is taken as a grocery list rather than an experimental story, we volition interpret it as proverb zilch across the named grocery items. For this reason, the artist'southward categorial intention should be treated as amid the contextual factors relevant to her work'southward identity. This movement is often adopted past theorists endorsing contextualism, such as maximizers or moderate intentionalists.

b. Notable Objections and Replies

Hypothetical intentionalism has received many criticisms and challenges that merit mention. A frequently expressed worry is that information technology seems odd to stick to a hypothesis when newly found evidence proves it to exist false (Carroll, 2001, pp. 208–9). If an artist's individual diary is located and reveals that our all-time hypothesis about her intention regarding her work is false, why should we cling to that hypothesis if the newly revealed intention meshes well with the work? Hypothetical intentionalism implausibly implies that warranted assertibility constitutes truth.

The hypothetical intentionalist clarifies her position (Levinson, 2006, p. 308) by maxim that warranted assertibility does not constitute the truth for the utterer'south meaning, but it does constitute the truth for utterance meaning. The ideal audience'southward best hypothesis constitutes utterance meaning even if information technology is designed to infer the utterer's pregnant.

Some other troublesome objection states that hypothetical intentionalism collapses into the value-maximizing theory, for, when making the best hypothesis of what the creative person intended, the interpreter inevitably attributes to the artist the intention to produce a piece with the highest degree of aesthetic value that the work tin sustain (Davies, 2007, pp. 183–84). That is, the epistemic benchmark for determining the best hypothesis is inseparable from the aesthetic criterion.

In answer, information technology is claimed that this objection may stem from the impression that an creative person normally aims for the all-time; however, this does not imply that she would conceptualize and intend the artistically best reading of the piece of work. Information technology follows that it is not necessary that the all-time reading exist what the artist most probable intended even if she could have intended information technology. The objector replies that, even so, the situation in which we have two epistemically plausible readings while one is inferior cannot ascend, because we would adopt the inferior reading only when the superior reading is falsified by evidence.

The third objection is that the distinction between public and private evidence is blurry (Carroll, 2001, p. 212). Is public prove published testify? Does published information from individual sources count as public? The answer from the hypothetical intentionalist emphasizes that this is non a stardom between published and unpublished information (Levinson, 2006, p. 310). The relevant public context should be reconstrued as what the artist appears to have wanted the audience to know about the circumstances of the work'south creation. This means that if it appears that the artist did non desire to make certain proclamations of intent known to the audition, then this evidence, fifty-fifty if published at a later point, does non plant the public context to be considered for estimation.

Finally, two notable counterexamples to hypothetical intentionalism accept been proposed (Stecker, 2010, pp. 159–lx). The first counterexample is that W ways p merely p is not intended by the artist and the audience is justified in believing that p is not intended. In this instance hypothetical intentionalism falsely implies that W does not mean p. For example, it is famously known amid readers of Sherlock Holmes adventures that Dr. Watson's war wound appears in two unlike locations. On one occasion the wound is said to be on his arm, while on another it is on his thigh. In other words the Holmes story fictionally asserts impossibility regarding Watson'southward wound. Only given the realistic fashion of the Holmes adventures, the best hypothesis of authorial intent in this case would deny that the impossibility is part of the pregnant of the story, which is patently false.

However, the hypothetical intentionalist would not maintain that West means p, because p is non the best hypothesis. She would non claim that the Holmes story fictionally asserts impossibility regarding Watson's wound, for the best hypothesis fabricated by the ideal reader would be that Watson has the wound somewhere on his trunk—his arm or thigh, but exactly where we do non know. It is a mistake to presuppose that W ways p without following the strictures imposed by hypothetical intentionalism to properly reach p.

The second counterexample to hypothetical intentionalism is the instance where the audition is justified in believing that p is intended by the artist but in fact W means q; the audience would then falsely conclude that Westward means p. Over again, what W ways is adamant by the ideal audience's best hypothesis based on convention and context, not by what the piece of work literally asserts. The significant of the work is the product of a prudent cess of the total show available.

6. Hypothetical Intentionalism and the Hypothetical Artist

a. Overview

In that location is a second variety of hypothetical intentionalism that is based on the concept of a hypothetical creative person. Generally speaking, information technology maintains that interpretation is grounded on the intention suitably attributed by the interpreter to a hypothetical or imagined artist. This version of hypothetical intentionalism is sometimes called fictionalist intentionalism or postulated authorism. The theoretical apparatus of a hypothetical artist can be traced back to Wayne Berth's account of the "implied author," in which he suggests that the critic should focus on the author we can make out from the work instead of on the historical author, considering there is often a gap between the two.

Though proponents of the present brand of intentionalism disagree on the number of acceptable interpretations and on what kind of show is legitimate, they agree that the interpreter ought to concentrate on the advent of the work. If information technology appears, based on internal bear witness (and mayhap contextual data if contextualism is endorsed), that the creative person intends the work to mean p, then p is the right interpretation of the work. The artist in question is non the historical artist; rather, it is an creative person postulated past the audition to be responsible for the intention made out from, or implied past, the work. For example, if there is an anti-war attitude detected in the work, the intention to castigate war should be attributed to the postulated artist, not to the historical artist. The motivation behind this movement is to maintain work-centered interpretation just avoid the fallacious reasoning that any we find in the work is intended past the real artist.

Inheriting the spirit of hypothetical intentionalism, fictionalist intentionalism aims to make interpretation work-based but author-related at the same time. The biggest difference between the two stances is that, every bit said, fictionalist intentionalism does not appeal to the actual or existent artist, thereby avoiding any criticisms arising from hypothesizing most the real creative person such as that the best hypothesis most the real artist's intention should be abandoned when compelling show against it is obtained.

b. Notable Objections and Replies

The first business organization with fictionalist intentionalism is that constructing a historical variant of the actual artist sounds suspiciously like hypothesizing about her (Stecker, 1987). Just there is still a difference. "Hypothesizing about the actual artist," or more accurately, "hypothesizing the actual artist's intention," would be a characterization of hypothetical intentionalism rather than fictionalist intentionalism. The latter does not track the bodily artist's intention but constructs a virtual one. As shown, fictionalist intentionalism, unlike hypothetical intentionalism, is immune to any criticisms resulting from ignoring the actual artist'south proclamation of her intention.

A second objection criticizes fictionalist intentionalism for not being able to distinguish between different histories of artistic processes for the same textual appearance (Livingston, 2005, pp. 165–69). For example, suppose a work that appears to be produced with a well-conceived scheme did result from that kind of scheme; suppose further that a 2d work that appears the same actually emerged from an uncontrolled process. Then, if we follow the strictures of fictionalist intentionalism, the interpretations we produce for these two works would turn out to be the aforementioned, for based on the same advent the hypothetical artists we construct in both cases would exist identical. But these two works take dissimilar creative histories and the difference in question seems besides crucial to be ignored.

The objection here fails to consider the subtlety of reality-dependent appearances (Walton, 2008, ch. 12). For case, suppose the exhibit note beside a painting tells us it was created when the painter got heavily drunk. Any well-organized feature in the work that appears to effect from conscientious manipulation by the painter might now either look matted or structured in an eerie way depending on the feature's actual presentation. Compare this scenario to another where a (virtually) visually indistinguishable counterpart is exhibited in the museum with the exhibit note revealing that the painter spent a long period crafting the work. In this second case the audience'south perception of the work is not very likely to be the aforementioned every bit that in the beginning case. This shows how the apparent artist business relationship tin still discriminate between (appearances of) different creative histories of the same artistic presentation.

Finally, there is often the qualm that fictionalist intentionalism ends up postulating phantom entities (hypothetical creators) and phantom deportment (their intendings). The fictional intentionalist can respond that she is giving descriptions merely of appearances instead of quantifying over hypothetical artists or their actions.

7. Conclusion

From the above give-and-take we can notice two major trends in the debate. First, most tardily 20th century and 21st century participants are committed to the contextualist ontology of art. The relevance of art'southward historical context, since its first philosophical appearance in Arthur Danto's 1964 essay "The Artworld," continues to influence analytic theories of fine art interpretation. There is no sign of this trend diminishing. In Noël Carroll's 2016 survey article on interpretation, the contextualist ground is still assumed.

Second, actual intentionalism remains the nigh popular position among all. Many substantial monographs have been written in this century to defend the position (Stecker, 2003; Livingston, 2005; Carroll, 2009; Stock 2017). This intentionalist prevalence probably results from the influence of H. P. Grice'due south work on the philosophy of language. And once more, this trend, like the contextualist faddy, is still ongoing. And if we see intentionalism every bit an umbrella term that encompasses non only actual intentionalism but also hypothetical intentionalism and probably fictionalist intentionalism, the influence of intentionalism and its related emphasis on the concept of an artist or writer will be even stronger. This presents an interesting dissimilarity with the tendency in mail-structuralism that tends to downplay authorial presence in theories of interpretation, as embodied in the author-is-expressionless thesis championed by Barthes and Foucoult (Lamarque, 2009, pp. 104–15).

8. References and Further Reading

  • Beardsley, M. C. (1970). The possibility of criticism. Detroit, MI: Wayne Land Academy Press.
  • Contains four philosophical essays on literary criticism. The starting time ii are among Beardsley's most important contributions to the philsoophy of interpretation.

  • Beardsley, M. C. (1981a). Aesthetics: Problems in the philosophy of criticism (2nd ed.). Indianapolis, IN: Hackett.
  • A comprehensive volume on philosophical issues beyond the arts and also a powerful statement of anti-intentionalism.

  • Beardsley, M. C. (1981b). Fiction as representation. Synthese, 46, 291–313.
  • Presents the speech act theory of literature.

  • Beardsley, M. C. (1982). The artful point of view: Selected essays. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
  • Contains the essay "Intentions and Interpretations: A Fallacy Revived," in which Beardsley applies his speech act theory to the interpretation of fictional works.

  • Berth, W. C. (1983). The rhetoric of fiction (iind ed.). Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
  • Contains the original business relationship of the implied author.

  • Carroll, N. (2001). Beyond aesthetics: Philosophical essays. New York, NY: Cambridge Academy Press.
  • Contains in detail Carroll's conversation statement, discussion on the hermenutics of suspicion, defense force of moderate intentionalism, and criticism of hypothetical intentionalism.

  • Carroll, Northward. (2009). On criticism. New York, NY: Routledge.
  • An engaging volume on artistic evaluation and interpretation.

  • Carroll, N., & Gibson, J. (Eds.). (2016). The Routledge companion to philosophy of literature. New York, NY: Routledge.
  • Anthologizes Carroll'south survey article on the intention contend.

  • Currie, G. (1990). The nature of fiction. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.
  • Contains a defense of fictionalist intentionalism.

  • Currie, G. (1991). Work and text. Mind, 100, 325–40.
  • Presents how a commitment to contextualism leads to an important distinction between work and text in the case of literature.

  • Danto, A. C. (1964). The artworld. Journal of Philosophy, 61, 571–84.
  • First newspaper to describe attending to the relevance of a work's context of production.

  • Davies, S. (2005). Beardsley and the autonomy of the piece of work of art. Journal of Aesthetics and Fine art Criticism, 63, 179–83.
  • Argues that Beardsley is really a contextualist.

  • Davies, South. (2007). Philosophical perspectives on art. Oxford, England: Oxford Academy Press.
  • Part II contains Davies' defense of the maximizing position and criticisms of other positions.

  • Dickie, G. (2006). Intentions: Conversations and art. British Journal of Aesthetics, 46, 71–81.
  • Criticizes Carroll's conversation statement and actual intentionalism.

  • Goldman, A. H. (2013). Philosophy and the novel. Oxford, England: Oxford University Printing.
  • Contains a defense of the value-maximizing theory without a contextualist delivery.

  • Hirsch, E. D. (1967). Validity in interpretation. New Oasis, CT: Yale University Printing.
  • The almost representative presentation of extreme intentionalism.

  • Hirsch, E. D. (1976). The aims of interpretation. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
  • Contains a drove of essays expanding Hirsh's views on estimation.

  • Huddleston, A. (2012). The chat argument for actual intentionalism. British Journal of Aesthetics, 52, 241–56.
  • A bright criticism of Carroll's conversation argument.

  • Iseminger, G. (Ed.). (1992). Intention & interpretation. Philadelphia, PA: Temple Academy Press.
  • A valuable collection of essays featuring Beardsley's account of the work's autonomy, Knapp and Michaels' accented intentionalism, Iseminger's extreme intentionalism, Nathan's account of the postulated creative person, Levinson's hypothetical intentionalism, and 8 other contributions.

  • Jannotta, A. (2014). Interpretation and conversation: A response to Huddleston. British Periodical of Aesthetics, 54, 371–eighty.
  • A defense of the conversation statement.

  • Krausz, Chiliad. (Ed.). (2002). Is there a single right interpretation? University Park: Pennsylvania State University Printing.
  • Another valuable anthology on the intention debate, containing in detail Carroll'due south defense force of moderate intentionalism, Lamarque'southward criticism of viewing work-pregnant equally utterance pregnant.

  • Lamarque, P. (2009). The philosophy of literature. Malden, MA: Blackwell.
  • The 3rd and the fourth chapters discuss analytic theories of interpretation along with a disquisitional assessment of the writer-is-dead claim.

  • Levinson, J. (1996). The pleasance of aesthetics: Philosophical essays. Ithaca, NY: Cornell Academy Printing.
  • The tenth affiliate is Levinson'due south revised presentation of hypothetical intentionalism and the distinction between semantic and categorial intention.

  • Levinson, J. (2006). Contemplating art: Essays in aesthetics. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.
  • Contains Levinson's replies to major objections to hypothetical intentionalism.

  • Levinson, J. (2016). Aesthetic pursuits: Essays in philosophy of art. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.
  • Contains Levinson'south updated defense force of hypothetical intentionalism and criticism of Livingston's moderate intentionalism.

  • Livingston, P. (2005). Art and intention: A philosophical study. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.
  • A thorough word on intention, literary ontology, and the problem of interpretation, with emphases on defending the meshing condition and on the criticisms of the 2 versions of hypothetical intentionalism.

  • Nathan, D. O. (1982). Irony and the artist'southward intentions. Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, 22, 245–56.
  • Criticizes the notion of an intended audience.

  • Nathan, D. O. (2006). Fine art, meaning, and artist's significant. In Yard. Kieran (Ed.), Contemporary debates in aesthetics and the philosophy of art (pp. 282–93). Oxford, England: Blackwell.
  • Presents an account of fictionalist intentionalism, a critique of the chat argument, and a brief recapitulation of the publicity paradox.

  • Nehamas, A. (1981). The postulated author: Critical monism equally a regulative ideal. Critical Inquiry, 8, 133–49.
  • Presents another version of fictionalist intentionalism.

  • Stecker, R. (1987). 'Credible, Implied, and Postulated Authors', Philosophy and Literature 11, pp 258-71.
  • Criticizes different versions of fictionalist intentionalism

  • Stecker, R. (2003). Interpretation and construction: Art, speech, and the police. Oxford, England: Blackwell.
  • A valuable monograph devoted to the intention debate and its related bug such as the ontology of art, incompatible interpretations and the application of theories of art interpretation to police force. The book defends moderate intentionalism in detail.

  • Stecker, R. (2010). Aesthetics and the philosophy of art: An introduction. Lanham, Physician: Rowman & Littlefield.
  • Contains a affiliate that presents the disjunctive formulation of moderate intentionalism and the two counterexamples to hypothetical intentionalism.

  • Stecker, R., & Davies, S. (2010). The hypothetical intentionalist's dilemma: A reply to Levinson. British Journal of Aesthetics, 50, 307–12.
  • Counterreplies to Levinson's replies to criticisms of hypothetical intentionalism.

  • Stock, K. (2017). Only imagine: Fiction, interpretation, and imagination. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.
  • Contains a defence force of accented (the author uses the term "extreme") intentionalism.

  • Tolhurst, W. E. (1979). On what a text is and how it ways. British Journal of Aesthetics, 19, iii–14.
  • The founding document of hypothetical intentionalism.

  • Trivedi, South. (2001). An epistemic dilemma for actual intentionalism. British Journal of Aesthetics, 41, pp. 192–206.
  • Presents an epistemic dilemma for actual intentionalism and defense of hypothetical intentionalism.

  • Walton, K. 50. (2008). Marvelous images: On values and the arts. Oxford, England: Oxford Academy Printing.
  • A collection of essays, including "Categories of Fine art," which might have inspired Levinson's formulation of categorial intention; and "Style and the Products and Processes of Fine art," which is a defense of fictionalist intentionalism in terms of the notion "apparent artist."

  • Wimsatt, Due west. K., & Beardsley, Thousand. C. (1946). The intentional fallacy. The Sewanee Review, 54, 468–88.
  • The first thorough presentation of anti-intentionalism, commonly regarded equally starting point of the intention argue.

Author Information

Szu-Yen Lin
E-mail: lsy17@ulive.pccu.edu.tw
Chinese Civilization University
Taiwan